Thus, is not granted the States, processes and mental properties to have real existence. Therefore it is worth to conceptualize radical Behaviorism as a thesis of type eliminacionista. * To the extent that the mental does not exist, it is not possible to invoke it as a cause of the behavior, because that which does not exist – obviously – also has causal powers. * In addition, insofar as the mental does not exist, the Mentalists terms that denote it (such as pain, belief, hope and mental image) should banish from the vocabulary of psychology, lacking complete scientific meaning. ** The logical Behaviorism is, explicitly, a semantic thesis about the mental. Although implicitly, continues to be a thesis ontologically eliminacionista. A semantic thesis about mental supposed to focus the analysis on the meaning of the terms (e.
g., the words) that denote States, processes and mental properties (e.g., happiness, thinking and creative, respectively). Logical Behaviorism to difference of radical Behaviorism, part of the idea that Mentalists terms actually have meaning. Only that, at the time of deciding how that meaning, ends reducing it to relational settings between stimuli and responses. (2) Behaviorism logical (or philosophical) Anatomy of the semantic reduction for Behaviorism logical mental terms refer to provisions (e.g. potential behaviors of organisms) to behave in a certain way to certain stimuli. Its basic strategy is to reduce the scope of mental to enunciated hypothetical behavioral.
For that reason, it can be considered logical behaviourism assumes a relacionalista conception of the mental, rather than focus on the fenomicas intrinsic properties. (3) The identity theory persepctive (physicalism) Position in philosophy of mind that identifies the States and mental States and neural processes. To difference of Behaviorism, the identity theory admits the existence of States mediators between stimuli and responses (e.g., so-called Central States). Therefore, it also admits that the Mentalists terms have meaning.